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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E OF U T A H , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
J O H N F R A N K PACE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
B R I E F OF A P P E L L A N T 
S T A T E M E N T OF 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The appellant, John Frank Pace, appeals from a 
judgment and sentence entered against him in the Third 
Judicial District Court convicting him of burglary in 
the second degree and grand larceny. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The appellant was convicted by a jury of the 
crimes of burglary in the second degree and grand 
larceny on November 1, 1973. Judgment and sentence 
of the court was pronounced November 20, 1973, order-
Case No. 
13606 
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ing appellant to serve the indeterminate term as pro-
vided by law for the crime of burglary in the second 
degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the court below with 
the direction that the case be remanded for a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On October 31, and November 1, 1973, appellant 
was tried before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson on 
the charges of burglary in the second degree and grand 
larceny. The jury having retired to deliberate on their 
verdict, appellant called two witnesses to testify regard-
ing prior misconduct. 
Diana Hansen testified that Juror No. 7, Mrs. 
Zundel, had been dozing off and on (T. 207-209). Mrs. 
Hansen first noticed "she had her eyes closed, then her 
head started drooping, and very soon it would droop 
and she would catch herself and up she would come." 
(T. 207-208). She testified that Mrs. Zundel had kept 
her eyes closed for quite awhile and would jerk her head 
back up after it had been down for a couple of minutes 
(T. 209). The conduct was noticed by Mrs. Hansen 
for at least a half hour, during the testimony of Officer 
Phillips. (T. 209). Mrs. Hansen could see the front 
row of the jury while some jurors on the back row were 
blocked from her view. (T. 207). She did not observe 
any jurors, other than Mrs. Zundel, dozing off. 
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Ed Bialack testified that he had noticed Mrs. Zun-
del "nodding her head, her eyes closed, and she'd keep 
jerking her head back up, rubbing her eyes." (T. 211). 
He saw this conduct for an hour to an hour and a half 
during the introduction of evidence (T. 211) and dur-
ing the testimony of Officer Phillips (T. 214). Mr. 
Bialack also noticed Juror No. 4, Mrs. Zimmerman, 
"leaning back and closing her eyes, and then she'd open 
her eyes and rub them . . .then she'd close her eyes again 
and repeat the conduct" (T. 212, 213). He testified 
that Mrs. Zimmerman's inattentiveness went on for 
a period of up to two hours at times when both the prose-
cution and defense were examining witnesses (T. 213). 
At the conclusion of Mrs. Hansen's and Mr. Bialack's 
testimony, appellant entered a motion for a mistrial 
based on juror misconduct. 
The Court found no evidence that Juror No. 4 
ever went to sleep (T. 216). Commenting on Juror No. 
7, the Court stated: 
". . . the Court was observing the whole jury 
and did observe No. 7 did doze for a second 
twice, and each time I was going to call it to 
her attention, and she had awakened before I 
had a chance. She couldn't have been asleep, 
in the opinion of the court, from observation 
more than a second each time." (T. 217). 
The motion for mistrial was denied. (T. 217). 
Before reaching a verdict, the jury returned with 
a question regarding Instruction No. 4-C, Paragraph 
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1 (R. 261, T. 217). Upon the Court's request, the jury 
foreman, Mr. Siirola, read the instruction in question: 
"That on or about the 14th day of March, 
1973, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the defendant being considered took certain 
properties from Inter-Mountain Farmers 
Association, a corporation. (R. 216). 
Mr. Siirola indicated that the jury's question re-
garded the nature of the State's evidence covering items 
that were reportedly missing but not recovered. The 
jury wondered whether a statement by the alleged vic-
tims the following morning, that three saddles were mis-
sing, was sufficient to allow the jury to believe beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the saddles were taken by the 
appellants; or must the State prove that the saddles 
were actually involved (T. 218). 
Appellant asked to approach the bench but in re-
sponse to the question posed the Court stated: 
"This is circumstantial evidence. Nobody saw 
the saddles go out. And you may consider all 
the evidence surrounding the event, that they 
were there the day before and they weren't 
there the next morning, and the time involved, 
and any people that might have been around 
and determine from that whether theey were 
taken, and if so, who took them (T. 219) 
(emphasis added). 
After the jury had retired to the jury room to continue 
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deliberating on their verdict, the Court noted, regard-
ing their question; "I thought this one was rather simple, 
so I didn't bother to wait and send a written instruction 
on it." (T. 220). The appellant, through his attorney, 
took exception to the Court's verbal instructions on the 
basis that the law was aptly covered in the written in-
structions and that the Court's emphasis on the portion 
of the evidence it commented on necessarily stressed 
that point of evidence and stressed it inaccurately. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E COURT B E L O W E R R E D I N NOT 
D E C L A R I N G A M I S T R I A L ON T H E 
G R O U N D OF J U R O R I N A T T E N T I V E N E S S . 
Appellant urges that his Federal and State Consti-
tutional rights to trial by jury and confrontation of 
witnesses against him was abridged and that the trial 
court abused its discretion in its refusal to grant appel-
lant's motion for a new trial. 
Utah law specifically provides that a new trial may 
be granted when either misconduct by the jury or abuse 
of discretion by the court is shown. Utah R. Civ. P . 
Rule 59 (a)(1) (2). Appellant contends that the in-
attentiveness of the two jurors, as brought out in direct 
testimony, clearly constitutes prejudicial jury miscon-
duct. Furthermore, where the trial court failed to ques-
tion the jurors concerning their alleged inattention, the 
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issue, as raised by the testimony, was given only a cur-
sory examination. Such use of discretion by the court 
is clearly abusive. 
In criminal prosecution, accused persons are en-
titled to the fundamental rights of due process. U.S. 
Const. Amend. V. X I V ; Utah Const. Art. I, §7. Es-
sential to due process and also secured by the State and 
Federal Constitutions, are the rights to trial by an im-
partial jury and the fair opportunity to examine and 
cross-examine witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend. V I ; Utah 
Const. Art. I, §§ 10, 12. Surely the notion that the ap-
pellant has had his "day in court" must incorporate the 
idea that the trier of fact will effectively listen. By an-
alogy the right to counsel is not met unless effective 
counsel may be employed. The fundamental rights of 
an impartial jury trial and the power to call witnesses 
on one's behalf remain incohate where juror inattentive-
ness renders the system ineffective. Such uncorrected 
misconduct reduces due process to a sham. 
The general case law outlines the required showings 
of juror inattentiveness indirectly, usually by rejecting 
the claim for a lack or insufficiency of proof. Where 
it had been alleged that two jurors had slept throughout 
the trial, the court in Newman v. Los Angeles Transit 
Lines, 120 Cal. App. 2d 685, 262 P.2d 95 (1953), said 
that the evidence concerning the jurors' misconduct 
was hearsay and could not impeach their verdict. The 
court added that not only was there no proof that any 
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of the jurors had been sleeping, but that at no time did 
the trial judge observe such behavior. 
Denial of a motion for a new trial on the ground 
that one of the jurors was sleeping during the taking 
of testimony was held to have been proper in Yates v. 
State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 So. 880 (1890). The court found 
that the statements that the juror was sleeping were 
fully met and overturned by the juror's statement that 
he was not at any time sleeping. Furthermore, any pos-
sible objection was deemed to have been waived by 
failure to bring the occurrance to the attention of the 
trial court. 
I n addition to a sufficient showing that a juror 
had been asleep or inattentive during the course of the 
trial, the cases generally require a demonstration of pre-
judicial effect, i. e. that as a result of the lack of atten-
tion the juror failed to follow some important or essen-
tial part of the proceedings. 
Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A. 2d 751 (1960) 
held that there was an insufficient showing of miscon-
duct or inattentiveness by the jury. The court pointed 
out there was no showing of the lengths of time that 
the jurors were supposed to have been asleep -? <>f whal 
testimony was introduced during that time, so timt then* 
was no showing that the accused was in :wi\ way pre-
judiced. 
In State v. Melor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P . 635 (1928), 
this < "t n irt, reviewing a denial of a motion f?M- ?i uvw trial 
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on the ground that a juror had dozed off several times 
during the trial, upheld the denial. In that case, how-
ever, the juror himself testified that he was not uncon-
scious at any time and that he heard and understood 
all that transpired in the courtroom during the trial. 
As established by the record in this case, the gen-
eral requirements that inattentiveness must be proven 
in fact and that prejudicial error therefrom be shown 
have been met by appellant. Timely objection to the 
juror's conduct was made. (T. 216). Proof of the in-
attentiveness of the two jurors was given in testimony 
by two witnesses (T. 206, 210). The court itself ack-
nowledged that one of the jurors in question had been 
noticed to doze off (T. 217). Testimony regarding the 
inattentiveness established the point in the trial at which 
the conduct occured and what evidence was being given 
at the time. 
While the boundaries of inattentiveness, that when 
crossed constitute prejudicial error, are unclear, certainly 
the dozing of the jurors was sufficient to raise the issue 
of fairness in the court below. Reflection of common 
experience must reveal that anyone exhibiting such be-
havior over a period of at least one hour must, at best, 
be severly limited in his perception and ability to listen 
and evaluate. To construe such conduct as sufficient 
attentiveness by the jurors contradicts the test of one's 
own senses. 
Generally, in evaluating the impact of possible 
juror inattentiveness, trial courts base their decisions 
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upon the testimony of the juror in question. When 
evidence of inattentiveness is contradicted by the juror 
himself, the issue is placed into conflict for the trial court 
to resolve. Courts on appeal usually take the view that 
the determination as to whether the jury was in fact 
inattentive is a matter for the informed discretion of the 
trial court, reviewable onl yfor abuse. 
In the case at bar, where no attempt was made to 
disprove the evidence of juror misconduct, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a 
new trial. Incumbent on the trial court was the duty 
to examine the jurors in question. On the record it could 
not be said that the testimony of inattentiveness was 
refuted adequately by the court below. Where the sound 
discretion of the trial court has been abused to the pre-
judice of the defendant, the refusal of a motion for a 
new trial may be reversed by the appellate court. State 
v. Weaver, 786, Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931). Further-
more, the actual and implied misconduct of the two 
jurors is sufficient ground for granting a new trial. 
Other neighboring jurisdictions have presumed the 
presence of prejudice when dealing with fundamental 
and substantial rights of those persons accused before 
the courts. The Supreme Court of California has held 
that any error committed by the trial court which materi-
ally affected the substantial rights of the accused and 
might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice must be 
deemed prejudicial. People v. Weatherford, 164 P.2d 
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753 (1945). In 1970 the Court of Appeals of Arizona 
stated: 
"When events occur that cast an irrevocable 
cloud over the jury's fairness and impartiality, 
it is far better to grant the motion for mistrial 
and start over again. State v. Reynolds, 466 
P.2d 405,11 Ariz. App. 532 (1970). 
All trial errors which violate the Constitution do 
not automatically call for reversal. However, some trial 
errors are so basic they can never be harmless, and others 
at least switch the burden of proof to the State to prove 
they were not prejudicial. 
The California Supreme Court had affirmed a con-
viction and held that although the defendants had been 
denied their federal Constitutional rights through ad-
verse comment or their failure to testify, such a denial 
constituted harmless error under a California Constitu-
tional provision. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed saying that before an error involving the denial 
of a federal Constitutional right can be held harmless 
in a state criminal case, the reversing court must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, S.Ct. 874, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705 
(1967). Thus, the "beneficiary" of a Constitutional 
error must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 
Appellant respectfully submits that in light of the 
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juror misconduct that so prejudiced his substantial 
rights, and the abuse of discretion by the court below, 
a new trial must be granted as provided by law. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E G I V I N G OF ORAL I N S T R U C T I O N S 
BY T H E COURT B E L O W C O N S T I T U T E D 
R E V E R S I B L E ERROR. 
Appellant contends that the giving of oral instruc-
tions by the lower court was determental and prejudicial 
in two respects. The failure to reduce the instruction to 
writing, without a waiver of counsel, was a violation of 
express statutory commands. Secondly, the instructions 
directed attention to particular features of the evidence, 
assumed them to be proven, and thereby gave them 
undue prominence in the minds of the jurors. Appellant 
submits that each of the above-mentioned defects, when 
taken separately require reversal; when taken together, 
the prejudice created was so overwhelming as to com-
mand reversal. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-31-1, (1953) governs 
the order of trial in a criminal case. Subsection (5) 
thereof mandates that at the conclusion of the evidence, 
the court shall instruct the jury as in civil actions. Rule 
51, Utah R. Civ. P . explicitly requires jury instructions 
to be in writing unless the counsel stipulate to the giving 
of oral instructions: 
"The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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action upon the request prior to instructing 
the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may 
be given orally, or otherwise waive this require-
ment, (emphasis added). 
This court, in construing §104-24-14, U.S. (1933), 
which is substantially similar to the present Rule 51, 
explained the reasons for the rule against oral instruc-
tions: 
" . . . Counsel for the defendants clearly had the 
right to object to oral instructions . . ." so that 
". . . [the] defendants would have reasonable 
opportunity to examine them and enter ob-
jections and that the jury could have them in 
their deliberations." State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 
507, 522, 51 P.2d 1052, 1060 (1935). 
The record desclises the abuse of any consent sought 
or given to waive the requirement of written instruc-
tions. In fact, counsel requested to approach the bench 
upon hearing the question from the jury, but the request 
was not responded to by the court. (T. 218). Although 
the failure to do so may have been because the Court 
". . . thought this one was rather simple. . ." (T. 220), 
it cannot be so lightly dismissed. This is so because the 
chief objections to oral instructions still remain. Counsel 
for appellant had no opportunity to examine the charge 
beforehand, and were therefore unable to enter appro-
priate objection. Furthermore, by depriving the jurors 
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of all but mental impressions of the instructions, it is 
not clear that they knew what those instructions were. 
This point was underscored in Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 
631 (1883). In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed a murder conviction, where it appeared 
that the judge gave an oral instruction in disregard of 
§257, cl. 7, Utah Code of Crim. P . (1878), requiring 
instruction to be in writing. The Court emphasized the 
need of the jury to have all the instructions present in 
deliberations, so that there would be no doubt as to what 
those instructions were. 
In Kunz v. Nelson, 94 Utah 185, 76 P.2d 577 
(1938), this court again had occasion to consider the 
effect of a failure to give written instructions without 
the consent of counsel. While the case concerned a civil 
action for replevin, the language therein is equally ap-
plicable to criminal matters. §77-31-1 (5), supra. To the 
argument that the failure to give written instructions 
must be shown to be prejudicial in fact, the court replied: 
"The statute has manditory tone. We think 
the failure to reduce all substantial instruc-
tion to writing for the use of the jury in the 
jury room is itself reversible error and that 
we cannot inquire as to whether it in fact was 
actually prejudicial. I t will be irrefutably 
presumed to be prejudicial." 76 P.2d at 584. 
Appellant contends that the instruction on circum-
stantial evidence was substantial. I t concerned a major 
point of confusion for the jurors, as disclosed by the 
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record. Furthermore, such instruction was necessary 
for the jury to make its ultimate determination of guilt 
or innocence. 
Appellant respectfully submits that absent a wai-
ver, the failure of the court below to reduce the instruc-
tion to writing for the use of the jury constitutes re-
versible error. 
Appellant further contends that there was a second, 
independent vice in the submission of the oral charge 
to the jurors. As the record amply discloses, the instruc-
tion directed the attention of the jurors to a specific 
feature of the evidence, the disappearance of the saddles. 
(T. 219). The jury may easily have understood from 
the instructions that the evidence conclusively establish-
ed that the saddles were removed during the course of 
the alleged offense. I t is contended that the question 
of whether or not the saddles were missing was a fact 
to be determined by the jury. 
The general rule is that instructions in criminal 
cases must not assume a fact in dispute, and which must 
be found by the jury. In State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 
285, 163 P . 789, 792 (1917) this court said: 
"Courts, in charging jurors, should be very 
careful not to assume any material fact or facts. 
Jurors, who are laymen are always eager to 
follow the opinion or judgment of the court, 
and if the court assumes any material fact in 
the charge, the jurors are most likely to follow 
the assumption of the court. Indeed, we must 
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assume that such is the case unless the second 
clearly shows the contrary." 
In State v. Hanna, 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537 
(1933) a conviction for carnal knowledge of a female 
under the age of consent was reversed on the basis of 
erroneous instructions to the jury. The charge in effect 
invited the jurors to premise guilt or innocence upon 
whether or not they believed the defendant to be present 
at the time and place the offense was committed. This, 
the court said, " . . . thereby relived the jury of the 
necessity of weighing the evidence and determining for 
itself that question." Supra at 540. "That question", 
in the first instance, was whether or not an offense had 
in fact been committed. 
I t is appellant's contention that the language used 
by the court in the present case implicitly assumed that 
the saddles were missing. The jury was then invited to 
decide from that fact whether appellant had been in-
volved in their removal. The question of whether the sad-
dles were missing was one which the jury had to deter-
mine before it could consider the surrounding circum-
stances. 
Appellant contends that the language in the case 
at bar, that the jurors ". . .may consider all the evidence 
surrounding the event", that the saddles "were there 
the day before and they weren't there the next morning 
. . ." (T. 219) was prejudicially erroneous. In this re-
gard, the circumstances under which the instructions 
were given must be considered. The charge was conveyed 
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orally, by itself, and well after the original instruction 
was given. Appellant contends that these circumstances 
tended to impress upon the minds of the jurors that there 
could be only one inferece which they might reasoably 
raw: that the saddles were stolen, and appellant was 
culpable therefor. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the oral instruc-
tions given in the present case were prejudicial. By 
failing to reduce them to writing, the court violated 
statutory and judicial pronouncement directed against 
the dangers inherent in such instruction. Secondly, the 
instructions directed attention to specific features of 
the evidence and assumed they had been proven. Such 
assumption invaded the province of the jury and gave 
undue attention to those facts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the court below 
erred in denying the motion for mistrial for juror mis-
conduct which abridged appellant's rights of funda-
mental fairness; and that the oral instructions unduly 
influenced the jury creating prejudicial error, it is re-
spectfully submitted that the judgment of the court 
below be reversed and a new trial be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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